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bstract
I study market behavior around earnings releases for Chinese stocks, emphasizing the opening of the B share market to PRC investors on February
9th 2001. Before then, abnormal pre-announcement trading volume in the A share market (restricted to locals) suggests inside information, while
nnouncement period return and volume responses suggest “disagreement” in B and H share trading (restricted to foreigners). After that, B share
arket behavior more closely resembles A share trading. Similar changes are not observed in a “control”, the H share market, which remains
losed to PRC investors. There is little evidence that the change in pre-announcement activity in the B share market affects relative B and A prices
r reflects superior information about corporate performance.
 2013 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
EL classiﬁcation: G14; G15
tion
s
o
d
t
U
d
m
i
c
e
a
m
m
p
f
C
 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.eywords: Earning announcements; Information asymmetry; Market segmenta
.  Introduction
Much of the international finance literature emphasizes how
oreign investors can differ from domestic investors. For exam-
le, the cost of capital or access to information can vary by
ationality. We can sometimes measure and explore these dif-
erences directly when barriers to capital flows are significant.
It is often thought that information asymmetry works against
oreign investors because domestic investors can have private
nformation, especially in markets where disclosure require-
ents are low and insider trading is common. In the model
f Merton (1987), investors only trade a subset of available
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aper. I am grateful to Thomson Financial for access to their Institutional Brokers
stimate System (I/B/E/S) provided as part of a broad academic program to
ncourage earnings expectations research.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.ecurities with which they are “familiar”, because of high costs
f gathering and processing data. Brennan and Cao (1997)
evelop a model in which domestic investors possess an informa-
ion advantage over foreign investors in the domestic markets.
sing intraday data from Korea, Choe et al. (2005) find that
omestic individual investors have short-lived private infor-
ation advantages in trading individual stocks over foreign
nvestors. On the other hand, foreign investors, who are typi-
ally institutions, can enjoy better quantitative skills and trading
xperience, so they produce superior interpretations of public
nnouncements.1
The behavior of local and foreign investors in China’s stock
arkets has attracted research interest for a long time. While
uch of the work has been focused on the “B share discount
uzzle”, it is recognized that market behavior may reflect dif-
erential access to information by PRC versus foreign investors.
han et al. (2008) construct measures of information asymmetry
o examine the effect of information asymmetry on equity prices
n A share and B share markets. They find that information asym-
etry explains a significant portion of cross-sectional variation
n B share discounts after controlling for other factors. Chan
t al. (2008), decompose the bid-ask spread into adverse selec-
ion and order-processing components, finding a larger adverse
1 Bailey et al. (2004) infer from Singapore and Thailand data that foreigners
ave superior information processing ability relative to locals in those markets.
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election component in the A share market that is consistent with
RC investors enjoying greater access to information.
I use stock market reactions to earnings announcements to
etect the different reactions of investors to corporate news
n China’s segmented stock markets. Market behavior around
arnings announcements reveals whether some investors enjoy
re-announcement information and how they interpret the infor-
ation content of actual earnings releases. This helps us
haracterize the information environment and investor behav-
or in parallel markets in which trading of a particular stock is
plit into distinct markets for domestic and foreign traders. In
articular, we can reveal differences in information processed
y locals versus foreigners around public earnings announce-
ents. Furthermore, we contrast behavior in China’s B share
arket with a “control”, Hong Kong’s H share market which
emained closed to PRC investors after the opening of the B
hare market on February 19th 2001.
A summary of my empirical findings is as follows. I find
hat trading reactions take place much earlier in the A share
arket than in the B and H share markets. In particular, pre-
nnouncement abnormal trading volume without corresponding
rice changes in the A market suggest information leakage and
nsider trading by PRC investors. The more intense event-period
eturn volatility and trading volume in B and H share mar-
ets, compared to the A-share market, suggests more substantial
disagreement” or “difference of opinion” among the foreign
nvestors trading there. The trading activity in B share market
round earnings announcements changed immediately after the
pening to PRC investors, which reflects informed trading flow
rom the PRC domestic A share market to the B share market
nce the investment barrier is lifted. However, I find no evidence
hat the entry of PRC investors into the B share market makes
rices more reflective of corporate performance, which suggests
hat the removal of barriers does not enhance the informativeness
r efficiency of China’s stock markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
escribes the Chinese stock market while Section 3 outlines
ome testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the empirical
ests and Section 5 presents the basic empirical results. Section
 explores the broader implications of the apparent informa-
ion asymmetry between PRC and foreign investors. Section 7
ummarizes the paper.
.  Chinese  stock  markets
Chinese stock trading expanded rapidly with the opening of
hanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in
ovember 1990 and July 1991 respectively. The first shares
isted were known as A shares and could only be traded by
hinese citizens. Starting from early 1992, both exchanges
ntroduced B shares exclusively for foreign investors. A shares
nd B shares are identical in voting rights and dividends, but
ransactions in B shares are conducted in U.S. dollars for B
hares in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong dollar
or B shares in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Starting February
9th 2001, the government implemented a new policy. PRC
nvestors were permitted to invest in both A and B shares, while
H
m
d
a Finance 3 (2013) 180–191 181
oreign investors remained restricted to B shares, and certain
ther Chinese stocks listed overseas, such as H shares in Hong
ong, N shares in New York and S Shares in Singapore.
The information environment of China’s stock market is typ-
cal of an emerging capital market. There is much informal
ommunication among families, friends, and business asso-
iates, and there is a lack of disclosure regulation and insider
rading rules to “level the playing-field” between locals and
oreigners. As Allen et al. (2005) show, neither the legal nor
nancial system is well developed by existing standard in China,
nvestor protection is weak, and agency problems are severe
mong listed companies.
Much research in Chinese segmented A share and B share
arkets aims to explain the AB share discount. Bailey (1994)
s the very first paper on this subject, and it finds preliminary
vidence for foreign share discounts. Chakravarty et al. (1998)
evelop a model to show that information asymmetry explains a
ignificant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B share
iscount. Chan et al. (2008) demonstrate that A share market led
he B share market in price discovery before and after February
9th 2001. Chen et al. (2001) find the price difference between
 share and B share is primarily due to illiquid B share markets.
elatively illiquid B share stock have a higher expected return
nd are priced lower to compensate investors for increased trad-
ng costs. Mei et al. (2005) shows the trading caused by investors’
peculative motives can help explain a significant fraction of the
rice difference between A share and B share. Ma (1996) demon-
trates that in a setting where domestic investors can invest only
n A shares and foreign investors can invest in both B shares
nd other foreign shares, the price differences between B shares
nd B shares depend on investors’ attitudes toward risk, the cor-
elations between B shares and foreign shares, and investors’
xpectations about future returns.
In this paper instead of investigating the B share discount,
 compare the differential impact of earning announcements
cross A, B, and H share markets in China, and the change in
rading activity in the B share market once it is opened to PRC
nvestors. By investigating the information environment for both
omestic and foreign investors, I show the broader impact of the
nformation asymmetry.
.  Testable  hypotheses
In this section, I outline several testable hypotheses related to
nformation asymmetry across the A, B, and H share markets. I
lso offer two hypotheses concerning the broader impact of the
hange in information environment starting February 19th 2001
n market prices and efficiency.
For our first testable proposition, suppose there is informa-
ion leakage in the A shares market, thereby allowing some
RC investors to trade on private information prior to the formal
ublic disclosure of earnings:1. PRC investors have better pre-announcement private infor-
ation than foreign investors. Therefore, the A share market
isplays larger cumulative abnormal return before earnings
nnouncements than B and H share markets.
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Additionally, we must recognize that abnormal returns only
easure the average market reaction, while abnormal trading
olume reflects differences in trader reactions. As Bhattacharya
t al. (2000) point out, private information can be incorporated
nto prices in advance of the formal earnings announcement,
ndeed, there may be no observable market reaction at the
nnouncement. Furthermore, informed investors may attempt
o mask their informed trading. Thus, abnormal returns may not
ecessarily be observed around earnings events:
1a. Abnormal trading volume before earning announcements
n the A share market is larger than in the B and H share markets.
Next, we consider changes in China’s market segmenta-
ion regime. After February 19th 2001, PRC investors could
nvest in the B share market. Therefore, it is plausible that pre-
nnouncement private information (H1a) begins to appear in
he B share market starting at that time. B share price discount
ay have accelerated this flow.2 Thus, trading patterns in the B
hare market becomes more similar to that in the A share market
tarting from February 19th 2001:
2. The B share market displays larger pre-announcement
eactions around earnings announcements after the opening of
 share trading to PRC investors.
Next, we consider what happened starting from February 19th
001 in Hong Kong’s H share market, which lists Chinese shares
ut, unlike the B share market, was not opened to PRC investors
n February 19th 2001. We predict that the trading behavior
round earnings releases in the H share market does not change
ppreciably after February 19th 2001 as B share market:
2b. After the opening of the B share market to domestic
nvestors, the H share market displays the same pre-
nnouncement trading activity as before.
We may also think about different types of private infor-
ation. In the model of Kim and Verrachia (1997), there are
wo kinds of private information: pre-announcement informa-
ion is gathered in anticipation of a corporate announcement,
hile event-period private information provides interpretation
or an announcement. The latter may be thought of as dif-
erential judgments (or disagreement) about an announcement
hat is unrelated to pre-announcement inside information. In
he B share market prior to February 19th 2001, there may be
o information leakage and all foreign investors react to the
nnouncements during the event-periods. Furthermore, foreign
nvestors are often institutions that have superior information-
rocessing abilities which may lead to more different opinions,
hereby stimulating more event-period information asymmetry
nd trading:3. Foreign investors have more diverse interpretations of
arning announcements. Therefore, the B and H share markets
2 Chan et al. (2008) find that, after February 19th 2001, the A share market
o longer dominates price discovery, and B market activity predicts subsequent
uote revisions in the A share market.
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isplay larger event-period reactions than the A share market
rior to February 19th 2001.
Theoretical works also describe a relationship between trad-
ng volume and price reactions that depends on “disagreement”
mong heterogeneous traders during the announcement period.
n Kim and Verrachia (1997), the existence of pre-announcement
rivate information implies that trading volume is positively
elated to the absolute value of price change at the time of a
ublic announcement. In contrast, when there is only event-
eriod private information, trading volume is independent of
rice change. Therefore, the extent of correlation between abnor-
al trading volume and abnormal returns reveals the degree of
nnouncement period disagreement. When combined with H1,
his yields:
4. The relationship between trading volume and absolute
eturn reactions to earning announcements is weaker in the B
hare market prior to February 19th 2001, but remains the same
n the H share market.
Next, we consider how market responses to earnings releases
ay vary with company characteristics. Bamber et al. (1999)
oints out that investors are likely to find announcements of
mall companies are especially informative, because relatively
ittle information is available before earnings announcements
ates. More informative announcements lead to greater belief
ispersion, which in turn generates higher abnormal event period
rading. Meanwhile, investors who act on their differential inter-
retations are likely to trade when there is enough liquidity to
elp camouflage their own information-based trades. As Admati
nd Pfleiderer (1988) argue, informed investors trade more
ctively in periods when liquidity trading is concentrated:
5. Event period reactions are higher for smaller firms and
rms with more liquidity.
Market responses are likely to be larger for larger earnings
urprises. Furthermore, larger forecast dispersion and number of
nalysts is likely to be associated with more differential interpre-
ations and, therefore, larger market responses. Assuming much
ess pre-announcement information, responses in B and H share
arkets should be larger:
6.  Event-period reactions are higher for firms with larger
arning surprise, forecast dispersion, or number of analysts.
hey are higher in B and H share markets than in the A share
arket.
We also consider the broader implications of information
symmetry for the pricing and effectiveness of the markets for
hinese stocks. Following Merton (1987), the observed sub-
tantial discount at which B shares typically trade relative to A
hares may result from the information disadvantage of foreign
nvestors relative to PRC investors3:
3 Bailey et al. (1999) find the p premiums for unrestricted shares are positively
orrelated with market liquidity. Chen et al. (2001) find the relative trading
olume and relative turnover of B-shares to A-shares are strongly negatively
elated to the discount.
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Table 1
Summary Time period is January 1st 1995–September 30th 2011. Sample is confined to firms with trading activity in both restricted and unrestricted markets around
the earning announcements dates.
Variables Definition Shenzhen A
share
Shenzhen B
share
Shanghai A
share
Shanghai B
share
Hong Kong H
share
Number of sample firms 27 21 79 65 20
Mean market cap Aggregate value of a firm’s
outstanding common shares
3456.554 1,762,194 2342.645 2773.263 3223.322
Earnings surprise Announced earnings minus mean of
most recent forecasts reported by
I/B/E/S normalized by absolute value
of forecast mean
0.234 0.321 0.111 0.083 0.941
Forecast dispersion Standard deviation of forecasts
normalized by the absolute value of
forecast mean
0.0456 0.0564 0.0543 0.0245 0.0632
Mean number of analysts per Mean number of analysts who have 9.6433 7.5341 5.7542 4.7862 8.342
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firm at end of year
7.  The B share discount is larger for firms with more pre-
nnouncement private information and firms with low liquidity.
We can also ask whether an increased flow of what appears to
e pre announcement information increases the informativeness
f the B share market starting February 19th 2001. For example,
rior to February 19th, 2001, if a firm is expected to perform
ell, the stock price in the A share market may increase more
han the stock price in the B share market if A share traders
njoy superior private information. Therefore, an increase in the
 share discount is associated with positive change in accounting
erformance. After February 19th 2001, the change in the gap
etween A and B prices and its association with subsequent
hanges in accounting performance becomes smaller, because
he private information of PRC investors can now flow into both
 and B markets:
8. The B share discount predict firms’ performance better
rior to February 19th 2001.
.  Experimental  design
.1.  Data
My sample period is January 1st 1995 to September 30th
011. I use several criteria to choose the sample. First, stocks
eed to be listed in at least two stock markets, the A share mar-
et and either the B or H share market. In other words, the stock
hould be available to both PRC and foreign investors. Second,
arning announcement dates, values, analyst earning forecasts
nd forecast dispersion are available from the Institutional Bro-
ers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Third, stocks must have earning
orecasts information both before and after February 19th 2001.
ourth, daily prices, trading volumes, market value, book return
n equity (ROE) and book return on assets (ROA) are available
rom Datastream International.Table 1 summarizes the firms and earning announcements
n the final sample. Due to the lack of data, illiquid trading,
r lack of analyst coverage, many firms listed in A, B and H
arkets are not included. From the Shanghai Stock Exchange,
t
Z
b select 65 companies with both A shares and B shares and 14
ompanies with both A shares and H shares. From the Shenzhen
tock Exchange, I select 21 companies with both A shares and
 shares, and 6 companies with both A shares and H shares. The
ata for A share trading (878 earnings events for 106 companies)
iffers slightly from the data for B and H share trading (564
vents of 86 companies listed as B shares and 133 events of 20
ompanies listed as H shares) due to some missing data from
he B and H share markets. The mean number of analysts per
rm-event is low, perhaps because the amount of research on
hinese stocks remains modest.
.2.  Methodology
.2.1.  Event  study
I begin with an event study to examine market responses
round earnings announcements. The announcement date is
efined as day 0, the estimation period is from day −200 to
ay −11, the pre-announcement period is from −10 to −1, and
he event-period is from −1 to +1.
The absolute value of abnormal returns around the announce-
ent period is calculated based on a market model in Brown and
arner (1985). The parameters in the model are estimated by
rdinary least squares using 190 returns over the interval from
200 to −11 trading days prior to the announcement dates. The
arket return is the index return in each stock market, imply-
ng the use of five market index returns, the Shanghai A share
ndex, Shanghai B share index, Shenzhen A share index, Shen-
hen B share index and Hong Kong H share index. Given the
otential for thin trading in the B share market, I follow the
trade-to-trade” return approach of Maynes and Rumsey (1993).
o measure the return volatility, I follow Kim and Verrachia
1991) and use the absolute value of abnormal returns. Then I
ollow Corrado (1989) and use the nonparametric rank test to
xamine the statistical significance. The statistic test is adjusted
o accommodate infrequent trading according to Corrado and
ivney (1992).
Abnormal daily trading volume is calculated as the difference
etween trading volume and the mean daily volume for that stock
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ver window (−200, −11) normalized by the mean volume.
hen, I follow Corrado (1989), using the nonparametric rank test
o examine the significance of the mean standardized abnormal
rading volume for each day in the event window.
.2.2. Cross-sectional  regressions
Next, I relate residuals to company and event characteristics
o see how information content relates to different firm level
haracteristics. I regress cumulative absolute abnormal return
nd cumulative abnormal trading volume on firm characteristics
o further explore the testable hypotheses outlined earlier. The
umulative abnormal return is calculated over the three days
indow (−1, +1), and the absolute value is taken to proxy for
eturn volatility. Abnormal trading volume is cumulated over the
dentical three-day event window. Previous research shows that
here can be a significant positive relationship between abnormal
rading volume and absolute abnormal return around earnings
nnouncements dates (as in H4), so I include the absolute value
f cumulative abnormal return in the regression of the abnormal
rading volume.
First, I construct variables related to the information envi-
onment. Earning surprise, which is the reported value minus
he mean forecast divided by the absolute value of the mean
orecast, is used to measure forecast precision. The number of
nalysts, which measures the amount of resources devoted to the
rm, is number of analysts providing forecasts of a particular
arnings event. The forecast dispersion is the standard deviation
t
a
t
w
able 2
vent study of A, B and H share trading around earning announcement dates for full
ay Abnormal return 
A share B share A share H share 
10 0.0012 −0.0009 −1.7E−05 0.0013
9 0.0044** −0.0004 −0.0018 0.0021
8 −0.0013 0.0032 0.0015 0.0035
7 −0.0006 −0.0016 0.0010 0.0045
6 0.0006 0.0011 −0.0028 0.0019
5 −0.0041** −0.0022 −2.9E−05 0.0042
4 0.0025 0.0036** 0.0012 0.0002
3 0.0017 0.0006 −0.0022 0.0028
2 0.0006 −6.5E−05 −0.0011 −0.0012
1 −0.0021 0.0005 −0.0021 0.0021
 0.0004 −0.0008 −0.0020 −0.0048
 −0.0020 0.0041*** 0.0056*** −0.0032
 0.0039** 0.0002 0.0026 0.0013
 −0.0015 −0.0004 −0.0008 0.0050
 0.0007 −1.9E−05 −0.0003 0.0051
 0.0003 −0.0005 0.0027 0.0039
 −0.0013 0.0002 0.0003 0.0016
 0.0024 −0.0008 −0.0024 0.0012
 0.0005 −0.0004 −9.2E−05 0.0007
 −0.001 0.0007 0.0020 0.0003
0 −3.6E−06 −0.0004 −0.0027 0.0011
he table reports the event-study results after adjusting for infrequent trading for A, B
bnormal return and abnormal trading volume, A, B and A, H are matched pairs. Si
-test is reported to test for the difference.
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
** Represent significance at the 1% level.
bnormal returns and abnormal volume around (−10, 10) window (1995.1.1–2011.9 Finance 3 (2013) 180–191
f individual analyst most recent forecasts of a firm’s earnings.
t is a measure of pre-announcement uncertainty.
Second, I construct dummy variables. “POST” tests the pre-
iction that the change of information environment in the B
hare market. It equals 1 after February 19th 2001, and equals 0
therwise. I also construct a “B H dummy” to test the different
nvironments between the A share and B, H share markets. It
quals 1 for B and H share market responses, and equals 0 for
 share market responses.
Other company characteristics are as follows. Market value
f common shares outstanding at the end of the year is used to
easure the size of the company. I also construct the illiquidity
easure of Amibud (2002), defined as the average ratio of the
aily absolute return to the trading volume on that day.
.  Empirical  results
.1.  Event  study  results
Table 1 presents the event study results for absolute value of
bnormal returns (left-hand panel), and abnormal trading vol-
me (right-hand panel) from January 1st 1995 to September
0th 2011. It presents daily abnormal returns and abnormal
rading volume back to day −10 to capture the potential pre-
nnouncement reaction to private information, with days −10
o −2 defined as the pre-announcement period during which
e may observe evidence of information leakage prior to the
 sample (January 1st 1995–September 30th 2011).
Abnormal trading volume
A share B share A share H share
 0.3413*** 0.1296** 0.0580 0.1465**
 0.3578*** 0.5006** 0.1716* 0.3304**
** 0.3882*** 0.3772** 0.1376 0.1936**
** 0.3669*** 0.2828** 0.2194** 0.3478**
 0.3580*** 0.2365** 0.2947** 0.1946**
** 0.4076*** 0.3237** 0.2591** 0.1963**
 0.4129*** 0.3773*** 0.3330** 0.3075**
 0.5389*** 0.5550*** 0.3367** 0.3404***
 0.7371*** 0.6863*** 0.2774** 0.3140***
 0.8769*** 0.7805*** 0.2604** 0.4525***
 0.8083*** 0.7645*** 0.3915** 0.7919***
 0.8462*** 0.7191*** 0.7613*** 1.0801***
 0.6948*** 0.6002*** 0.7781*** 0.7901***
** 0.7877*** 0.6903*** 0.7514*** 0.6505***
** 0.8536** 0.6448*** 0.6355*** 0.5596***
** 0.8234*** 0.7114*** 0.7048*** 0.6419***
 0.7312*** 0.5633*** 0.7779*** 0.7139***
 0.5631*** 0.9411** 0.7879*** 0.6022***
 0.6112*** 0.5699** 0.6813*** 0.4590**
 0.6243*** 0.6466*** 0.8408*** 0.5049***
 0.5993*** 0.6621*** 0.7798*** 0.5357***
 and H shares for a 21 day interval around earnings announcements. For both
gnificance is tested using the Corrado (1989) non-parametric test. Parametric
.30).
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ormal earnings information. The event-period is defined as day
1 to +1. I find a significant increase in return volatility on
ay +1 in A, B and H share markets. This suggests that earn-
ng announcements have discernable effects on all markets. The
re-announcement abnormal trading volumes are statistically
ignificant in all markets.
Next, the sample period is divided into two. This reflects
he change in segmentation that occurred when PRC investors
ere allowed access to the B market starting February 19th
001. Results for the period January 1st 1995 to February 19th
001 are reported in Table 2. Return volatility increases signifi-
antly around announcement dates in A, B and H share markets.
gain, the pre-announcement abnormal volume is significant
n the A share market, but not significant in both B and H
hare markets. It is consistent with H1, which predicts that PRC
nvestors have better pre-announcement private information than
oreign investors. Abnormal return and abnormal trading vol-
me behavior are very similar for both the B and H share
arkets.
Results for the period February 19th 2001 to September 30th
011 are reported in Table 3. The market reaction has changed
n the B share market with the entrance of PRC investors into
he B share market. The pre-announcement abnormal volume is
ow significant in the B share market, while remaining insignif-
cant in the H share market. This is consistent with H2 and H2b,
hich predict that the lifting of the restriction changes trading
atterns in the B share market. When combined with H1 and
r
t
a
s
able 3
vent study of A, B and H share trading around earning announcement dates for Janu
ay Abnormal return 
A share B share A share H share 
10 −0.0004 −0.0027 0.0006 0.0005 
9 −0.0010 −0.0021 −0.0019 0.0008 
8 0.00065 0.0025 0.0005 0.0002 
7 0.0011 0.0040* −0.0018 0.0020 
6 −0.0019 0.0005 −0.0053* 0.0006 
5 −0.0012 −0.0003 0.00013 0.0021 
4 0.0064** 0.0031 −0.0012 −0.0006 
3 −0.0012 0.0013 −0.00178 0.0023 
2 0.0006 0.0007 −0.0008 6.85E−05
1 0.0042** 0.0018 0.0005 0.0002 
 0.0054*** 0.0056** 0.0055** −0.0053 
 −0.0016 −6.8E−05 0.0065** −0.0007 
 −0.0001 0.0023 0.0025 0.0014 
 −0.0020 −0.0021 0.0004 0.0045*
 0.0011 −0.0001 −0.0003 0.0043 
 0.0031 0.0013 0.0045 0.0034*
 0.0023 0.0004 −0.0001 0.0025 
 −0.0021 −0.0012 −0.0030 0.0032 
 0.0002 0.0025 0.0011 0.0017 
 −0.0002 −0.0012 0.0025 −0.0009 
0 0.0038** −0.0018 −0.0020 −0.0013 
he table reports the event-study results after adjusting for infrequent trading for A, 
bnormal return and abnormal trading volume, A, B and A, H are matched pairs. Si
-test is reported to test for the difference.
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
** Represent significance at the 1% level.
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he ability of PRC investors to enter the B share market starting
ebruary 19th 2001, the evidence suggests that traders with pre-
nnouncement private information entered the B share market
tarting February 19th 1959. In contrast, the H share market
emonstrates no change in information environment. This fur-
her confirms that the change in market segmentation drives the
hange in the information environment (Table 4).
.2.  Cross-sectional  regression  results
Next, I estimate the relation between abnormal market
esponses and firm-event characteristics to further explore the
estable hypotheses outlined earlier. In Panel A of Table 5, the
bsolute cumulative abnormal return from −1 to +1 is regressed
n several explanatory variables as previously discussed. In
rder to see the difference between domestic and foreign trad-
ng, I use the intercept “B H dummy” and related slope dummy
erms. “B H dummy” equals 1 for B or H share market responses
nd 0 for A share market responses.
In all specifications, the intercept dummies are significantly
ositive, which implies a larger return volatility reaction to
arnings announcements in foreign share markets during the
vent-period. This is consistent with H3. That is, foreign investor
eactions to the earning announcement are concentrated in
he event period, which indicates differential interpretations of
nnouncements. The coefficient for market value is negatively
ignificant, which is consistent with H5. Thus, it is harder for
ary 1st 1995–February 19th 2001.
Abnormal trading volume
A share B share A share H share
0.2173** 0.1470 0.1131 −0.0470
0.1924** 0.1448 0.3269 0.0405
0.1945** 0.1894 0.0542 −0.0247
0.2001** 0.2080 0.1713* 0.1473
0.1232 0.4552** 0.0308 0.1030
0.1010 0.1758 0.0296 0.0224
0.3291** 0.1254 0.1499** 0.1044
0.3250*** 0.1844 0.1463** 0.3008*
 0.5506*** 0.9962** 0.2028** 0.1285
0.5997*** 1.0646** 0.3004** 0.0967
0.7812*** 1.1917** 0.7166*** 0.2519*
0.7568*** 0.9703** 1.1196*** 0.6167***
0.5214*** 1.0362** 0.8820*** 0.5739**
0.3791*** 1.4289** 0.6355*** 0.5942**
0.3996** 0.9619** 0.3793*** 0.4627**
0.2587** 0.8304** 0.4235*** 0.6612**
0.5378** 0.8660** 0.4225*** 0.6988***
0.3433** 1.0222** 0.5251*** 0.5454**
0.2437** 0.5498** 0.4351*** 0.6046**
0.4443** 0.7747** 0.4001*** 0.8133***
0.3247** 0.7666** 0.3455*** 0.5792***
B and H share for a 21 day interval around earnings announcements. For both
gnificance is tested using the Corrado (1989) non-parametric test. Parametric
.19).
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Table 4
Event study of A, B and H share trading around earning announcement dates for February 19th 2001 to September 30th 2011.
Day Abnormal return Abnormal trading volume
A share B share A share H share A share B share A share H share
−10 0.0026 0.1169 −0.0012 0.0027 0.4450*** 0.1169* 0.2442** 0.2184
−9 0.0093*** 0.1763 −0.0016 0.0049 0.4985*** 0.1763* 0.3937** 0.3381
−8 −0.0030 0.1532 0.0032 0.0105** 0.5492*** 0.1532* 0.4304** 0.3085
−7 −0.0020 0.1321** 0.0061 0.0099** 0.5041*** 0.1321 0.3465** 0.7628**
−6 0.0027 0.0861 0.0017 0.0045 0.5554*** 0.0861** 0.6384** 0.5607
−5 −0.0066** 0.2236 −0.0003 0.0084** 0.6566*** 0.2236** 0.6785** 0.5425
−4 −0.0007 0.2072 0.0055 0.0018 0.4842*** 0.2072** 0.7540** 0.6478
−3 0.0043*** 0.4651 −0.0028 0.0037 0.7234*** 0.4651** 0.3992** 0.7412
−2 0.0005 0.4703 −0.0015 −0.0039 0.8970*** 0.4703** 0.5516** 0.5427
−1 −0.0058** 0.5681 −0.0048 0.0059 1.1319*** 0.5689*** 0.5942** 0.7719**
0 −0.0003 0.4651 −0.0010 0.0037 0.8314*** 0.4651*** 0.6433** 0.9491*
1 0.0074** 0.5408 0.0086** 0.0084** 0.9215*** 0.5408*** 1.0489** 0.9988**
2 0.0025 0.8882** 0.0029 0.0008 0.8429** 0.2992** 1.2264** 0.5967
3 −0.0009 0.1917 −0.0054 0.0059 1.1133** 0.1917** 1.0597** 0.6808
4 0.0005 0.4183 −0.0003 0.0066* 1.2314** 0.4183** 0.9421** 0.9125*
5 0.0045 0.6263 −0.0007 0.0050 1.3013** 0.6263** 0.7871** 1.0540**
6 −0.0044 0.3457 0.0011 −0.0004 0.8973** 0.3457** 0.9225** 1.2742**
7 0.0063** 0.2122 −0.0014 −0.0031 0.7424** 0.8882** 0.9947** 0.7613*
8 0.0008 0.5835 −0.0022 −0.0014 0.9109*** 0.5835** 0.8093** 0.5062
9 −0.0019 0.5650 0.0009 0.0030 0.7660*** 0.5650** 0.8874** 0.7184*
10 0.0033 0.5936 −0.0041 0.0061** 0.8205*** 0.593** 1.1118** 0.9202**
The table reports the event-study results after adjusting for infrequent trading for A, B and H shares for a 21 day interval around earnings announcements dates. For
both abnormal return and abnormal trading volume, A, B and A, H are matched pairs. Significance is tested using the Corrado (1989) non-parametric test. Parametric
t-test is reported to test for the difference.
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
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bnormal returns and abnormal volume around (−10, 10) window (2001.2.19–
nvestors to get pre-announcement private information about
maller firm, so there is larger return volatility in the event
eriod.
Panel B of Table 5 presents evidence on the ability to explain
umulative abnormal trading volume with cumulative absolute
bnormal return and other variables during the event period. The
oefficient for cumulative absolute abnormal return is positive
nd significant. It suggests that there exists pre-announcement
rivate information: models predict that trading volume is pos-
tively related to price volatility during the event period when
uch information exists. According to H4, the slope dummy for
he cumulative absolute abnormal return should be negative and
ignificant (as shown by my earlier event study) if there is less or
o private information in B and H share markets. However, this
s not the case in Table 5. One possible explanation is that, as in
e and Wang (1995), exogenous information also affects trading
ehavior. For example, B share traders may possess no pre-
nnouncement information, but may learn from the prices and
olumes the A share market. Thus, pre-announcement private
nformation in the A share market may also affect trading activ-
ty in the B share market around announcements. The coefficient
or earning surprise is positive and significant, which means the
arger the earning surprise, the larger the event-period reaction.
he slope dummy for earning surprise is insignificant, which
hows that the reaction to the earnings surprise in B and H share
arkets is not significantly larger than the A share market. It sug-
ests that “disagreement” in the event period does not contribute
2
s
i.9.30).
uch to abnormal trading volume. Perhaps there is relatively lit-
le information or information production concerning Chinese
tock markets.
In order to further explore the change in information envi-
onment in the B share stock market, I estimate cross-sectional
egressions exclusively for B share market responses, utilizing
he POST dummy variable which is equal to 1 for earnings
nnouncements after February 19th 2001 and equal to 0 oth-
rwise. Table 6, Panel A presents results of cross-sectional
egression for absolute cumulative abnormal return in the B
hare market. Intercept dummies are negatively significant for
pecifications 1–4, which is consistent with H2. The B share mar-
et displays larger pre-announcement reactions around earning
nnouncements after February 19th 2001.
Table 6, Panel B presents results of cross-sectional regression
or abnormal trading volume in the B share market. In all spec-
fications, coefficients for cumulative absolute abnormal return
re not significant. This is consistent with H4. Recall that, in
im and Verrachia (1997), there is no relationship between trad-
ng volume and the absolute value of price change when there
s only event-period private information. The cumulative abso-
ute abnormal return dummy is positively significant, implying
 larger cumulative abnormal trading volume reaction to con-
urrent cumulative absolute abnormal return after February 19th
001. Dummies for specifications 1, 2, 4 and 6 are also positively
ignificant, which indicates a stronger reaction of abnormal trad-
ng volume after February 19th 2001.
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Table 5
Cross-sectional regression to explain the cumulative abnormal return and volume over (−1, +1) event period. Absolute value of the cumulative abnormal return
and cumulative abnormal trading volume over a three day (−1,1) is regressed cross-sectionally on explanatory variables including B, H dummy, earnings surprise,
number of analyst, forecast dispersion, illiquidity, market value and their slope dummy.
Panel A (dependent variable: cumulative absolute abnormal return)
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.0226 0.0197 0.0219 0.0231 0.0216
(20.06)*** (7.52)*** (14.06)*** (18.20)*** (15.64)***
B H dummy 0.0112 0.0142 0.0104 0.0209 0.0202
(1.78)* (2.18)** (1.77)* (2.50)** (2.12)**
Earnings surprise 0.0001
(0.32)
Surprise × dummy 0.0003
(1.38)
Number of analysts 0.0002
(0.94)
Analysts × dummy −0.0007
(−1.43)
Forecast dispersion 0.0172
(0.76)
Dispersion × dummy −0.0162
(−0.45)
Illiquidity 27.7884
(2.11)**
Illiquidity × dummy −24.5659
(−1.86)**
Market value −7.01E−7
(−2.52)**
MV × dummy −3.82E−7
(−0.78)
Adjusted R square 0.0441 0.0344 0.0523 0.0543 0.0545
Panel B (dependent variable: cumulative abnormal trading volume)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 0.6899 0.6813 0.6641 0.63650 0.73867 0.7536
(5.60)*** (5.86)*** (2.41)** (3.75)*** (5.74)*** (5.24)***
B H × dummy 0.0887 −0.0208 0.1410 0.17349 0.07338 0.0608
(0.50) (−0.12) (0.36) (0.71) (0.40) (0.30)
CAR 0.3529 0.3475 0.5080 0.35737 0.34795 0.3446
(3.95)*** (4.19)*** (4.01)*** (3.97)*** (3.89)*** (3.83)***
CAR × dummy 0.1033 0.1387 −0.0507 0.10055 0.09930 0.1126
(0.76) (1.06) (−0.30) (0.73) (0.73) (0.82)
Earnings surprise 0.0867
(6.32)***
Surprise × dummy 0.0119
(0.39)
Number of analysts −0.0042
(−0.16)
Analysts × dummy −0.0016
(−0.03)
Forecast dispersion 1.2614
(0.46)
Dispersion × dummy −2.0654
(−0.50)
Illiquidity −1719.3871
(−1.29)
Illiquidity × dummy 1637.0661
(1.23)
Market value 0.05E−7
(−0.86)
MV × dummy −0.25E−7
(−0.51)
Adjusted R square 0.0349 0.0433 0.0359 0.0352 0.0387 0.0360
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
*** Represent significance at the 1% level.
All tests are White heteroskedasticity consistent.
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Table 6
Cross-sectional regression to explain cumulative abnormal return and volume over (−1, +1) event period in B share market Absolute value of the cumulative abnormal
return and cumulative abnormal trading volume over a three day (−1,1) is regressed cross-sectionally on explanatory variables including POST, earnings surprise,
number of analyst, forecast dispersion, illiquidity, market value and their slope dummy.
Panel A (dependent variable: cumulative absolute abnormal return)
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.0220 0.0263 0.0194 0.0258 0.0212
(13.91)*** (7.33)*** (8.21)*** (13.01)*** (10.19)***
POST −0.0116 −0.0058 −0.0038 −0.0052 −0.0001
(−1.77)* (−2.02)** (−2.00)* (−1.69)* (−0.04)
Earnings surprise 0.0004
(1.61)
Surprise × POST 0.0003
(0.45)
Number of analysts −0.0008
(−1.33)
Analysts × POST 0.0008
(0.73)
Forecast dispersion 0.0801
(1.65)
Dispersion × POST −0.1402
(−2.14)**
Illiquidity 3.0255
(4.59)***
Illiquidity × POST 34.5816
(2.44)**
Market value 0.01E−7
(0.83)
MV × POST −0.05E−7
(−0.86)
Adjusted R square 0.0076 0.0037 0.0086 0.0626 0.0020
Panel B (dependent variable: cumulative abnormal trading volume)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant 1.2467 1.2452 0.8170 1.4175 1.4747 1.2655
(2.75)** (2.76)** (0.86) (2.25)** (2.84)** (2.28)**
POST 1.6864 1.2255 2.3875 1.270 1.8343 2.4801
(2.34)** (1.73)* (1.63) (1.29) (2.32)** (2.84)**
CAR −0.0458 −0.0477 −0.0558 −0.0426 0.0577 −0.0448
(−0.22) (−0.23) (−0.27) (−0.21) (0.22) (−0.22)
CAR × POST 2.1544 2.0613 2.1742 2.1454 2.3304 2.1822
(6.63)*** (6.18)*** (6.63)*** (6.59)*** (6.11)*** (6.72)***
Earnings surprise 0.0159
(0.24)
Surprise × POST −0.3857
(−2.06)**
Number of analysts 0.0864
(0.51)
Analysts × POST −0.1533
(−0.52)
Forecast dispersion −4.9055
(−0.39)
Dispersion × POST 10.2272
(0.61)
Illiquidity −162.2925
(−0.97)
Illiquidity × POST −1235.5
(−3.35)**
Market value −0.09E−7
(−0.06)
MV × POST −0.02E−7
(−0.16)
Adjusted R square 0.1289 0.1173 0.1294 0.1295 0.1534 0.1368
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
*** Represent significance at the 1% level.
All tests are White heteroskedasticity consistent.
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Table 7
Cross-section regression of B-share discount on various factors before and after
opening of the B-share market to Chinese investors.
Independent variables 1 2 3
Constant 5.1764 7.6544 6.5344
(8.67)*** (6.78)*** (8.34)***
POST dummy −9.7877 −8.6765 −5.6765
(−9.53)*** (−7.65)*** (−4.54)***
Information measure 0.4322 0.0235
(2.55)** (2.18)**
Information dummy −0.0345 −0.0234
(−1.34) (−0.45)
Illiquidity measure −0.567 −0.345
(−3.67)*** (−2.65)**
Illiquidity dummy 0.8898 0.7897
(3.69)*** (2.56)**
Adjusted R square 0.1232 0.1234 0.2001
This table reports cross-sectional regressions to explain B share discount. The
dependent variable is yearly B-share discount, which is the yearly A-share price
minus year currency-adjusted B share price, then divided by A-share price. Inde-
pendent variables include POST dummy, relative information measure, relative
illiquidity measure and their slope dummy. POST dummy equals to 0 before
February 19th 2001, equals to 1 after February 19th 2001. Relative information
measure is the ratio of pre-announcement cumulative abnormal volume of A
share divided by pre-announcement cumulative abnormal volume of B-share.
Relative illiquidity measure is the ratio of illiquidity of A share divided by the
ratio of illiquidity of B share.
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
** Represent significance at the 5% level.
*** Represent significance at the 1% level.
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all tests are White heteroskedasticity consistent.
.  What  is  the  broader  impact  of  the  information
symmetry?
To this point, my results suggest that the opening of the B
hare market to PRC investors has a substantial impact on the
nformation environment in that market. Specifically, the A share
arket has more pre-announcement trading than B and H share
arkets but, after February 19th 2001, the B share market shows
imilar trading patterns. What is the effect of this trading? Does
t imply that valuations in the A share market are more accurate
ecause more insider information is reflected in trading and,
herefore, valuations in the B share market become more accu-
ate after February 19th 2001? Or does it merely document that
he penchant for noise trading that previous papers have docu-
ented for PRC investors is being transmitted into the B share
arket after February 19th 2001?
First, I explore whether information asymmetry explains
ome of the B share discount puzzle in China. B shares are
raded at a substantial discount relative to A shares, in contrast
o premiums for foreign class shares observed in most other
ountries that have segmented trading (Bailey et al., 1999). The
arge discount for Chinese B shares relative to otherwise identi-
al A shares remains a puzzle. If information asymmetry is the
eason for the B share discount puzzle, then the decrease in the
iscount after February 19th 2001 may be due to the informa-
ion transmitted by A share traders now operating in the B share
arket.
o
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Table 7 presents cross-sectional regressions to explain the
nnual B share discount for time periods both before and after
he opening of the B share market to PRC investors. The annual
 share discount rate is calculated as the average daily price
f A share minus average daily currency-adjusted price of B
hare, divided by average daily price of B share. The informa-
ion asymmetry measure used in the regressions is the ratio of
re-announcement cumulative abnormal trading volume in the
 share market to pre-announcement cumulative abnormal trad-
ng volume in the B share market. Recall that the event study
hows that pre-announcement abnormal trading volume is sig-
ificant in the A share market but not in the B share market before
ebruary 19th 2001. After February 19th 2001, the A and B
hare markets show similar pre-announcement abnormal trading
olume. Thus, relative pre-announcement cumulative abnormal
rading volume is a measure of information asymmetry across
he two markets. When there is higher information asymme-
ry between A and B share markets, this ratio is larger, and the
 share discount is predicted to be larger too. So, the B share
iscount should be positively related to this information asym-
etry ratio. Since previous authors have suggested that liquidity
ay also explain the B share discount, I also include a relative
lliquidity measure (the ratio of Amihud illiquidity in the A mar-
et to Amihud liquidity in the B market) as a control variable.
 relatively small value of this ratio indicates relatively less B
hare liquidity and should be associated with a smaller B share
iscount.
In Table 7, all intercept dummies are negative and significant,
hich confirms that, after opening the B share market to PRC
nvestors, the B share discount decreases significantly. The coef-
cient on the relative information asymmetry measure is positive
nd significant, which is consistent with H7. The coefficient on
he relative illiquidity measure is negative and significant, and
he coefficient for the related slope dummy term is positive and
ignificant. This shows that, before the opening of the B share
arket, illiquidity in the B share market is a driver of the B share
iscount. After February 19th 2001, B share market illiquidity
s less important in explaining the B share discount.
Second, I test whether the measured pre-announcement
nformation asymmetry is associated with the stock market’s
bility to forecast corporate performance. If the abnormal pre-
nnouncement trading in the A share market is the result of
nside private information that is valuable for predicting cor-
orate performance, I predict that, after the opening of the B
hare market to PRC investors, the B share market offers more
ccurate predictions of firms’ performance. So, when I regress
he change in ROE or ROA the B share discount and the POST
ummy. POST dummy equals one after February 19th 2001,
nd equals to 0 otherwise. I expect that the association between
 share discount and performance is stronger prior to February
9th 2001, because the uninformativeness of the B share market.
he results are presented in Table 8. All coefficients are insignif-
cant, which is consistent with H8. Thus, there is evidence that
he change in pre-announcement activity in the B share market
t February 19th 2001 does not improve the predictive power
f the market over corporate performance, which is consistent
ith H8.
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Table 8
Regression of the change in book return on equity (ROE) and book return on
assets (ROA) on the change in B-share discount.
Independent variables Change of ROE Change of ROA
Constant −12.3211 −11.2131
(−1.45) (−1.09)
POST
dummy
−2.3423 −3.4322
(−1.37) (−1.65)
B-share discount 2.0923 3.5445
(1.36) (1.12)
Adjusted R square 0.0032 0.0033
This table reports regressions to test whether the B share discount can predict
firm’s accounting performance. The dependent variable is the change of ROE
and change of ROA. The change of ROA is ROA in 2002 minus ROA in 2000.
The independent variable is the change of B-share discount. B share discount
is calculated as average daily price of A share minus average daily currency-
adjusted price of B share, divided by average daily currency adjusted price of
B share.POST dummy equals to 0 before February 19th 2001, equals to 1 after
February 19th 2001. t-Test is reported to test for the difference.
* Represent significance at the 10% level.
*
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.  Summary  and  conclusions
I have documented the differential impact of earning
nnouncements on A, B and H share markets in China, and an
mportant facet of the change in trading activity in the B share
arket once it is opened to PRC investors. Pre-announcement
bnormal trading volume without any associated price changes
n the A share market suggests the existence of inside private
nformation in the market. More prominent event-period abnor-
al trading volume and return volatility in B and H share markets
mplies that foreign investors have more differential interpre-
ation and opinions about announcements than PRC investors.
here is also evidence that foreign investors may derive useful
nformation by observing pre announcement return and volume
hanges in the A share market, even if they have no direct access
o inside private information. Perhaps because of the underde-
eloped state of the market, the event-period market responses
re typically not correlated with conventional information meas-
res, such as earning surprises, forecast dispersion, and number
f analysts.
I further explore whether the information asymmetry has a
roader effect on the workings of the Chinese stork market.
 growing body of empirical evidence strongly suggests that
emoving barriers to stock market investment flows is bene-
cial. For example, permitting developing economy firms to
ap the global pool of capital facilitates useful investments
hat generate profits and employment. In particular, previous
uthors have found that the cost of capital declines significantly
fter market liberalizations (Bekaet and Harvey, 2000) and after
ross listings of individual foreign securities on U.S. exchanges
Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Errunza and Miller,
000). There may also be benefits in terms of better governance
hanges in the information environment. Doidge (2004) shows
ow cross-listing in the U.S. improves the protection afforded to
inority investors and decreases the private benefits of control.
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ailey et al. (2006) find the increased disclosure faced by cross
isted firms affects the information environment around earnings
nnouncements.
In the case of opening China’s B share market to PRC
nvestors, we might imagine that the increased flow of infor-
ation into the B share market enhances efficiency. While I
ndeed document a change in the B share market’s information
nvironment around earnings releases, I find no evidence that the
ntry of PRC traders into the B share market makes prices more
eflective of corporate performance. This raises the question of
hether or not the “liberalization” of the B share market is ben-
ficial or merely allows noise trading behavior to spill from the
 share market into the B share market. I hope that my tentative
esults will stimulate further research on the impact of increased
penness on China’s stock markets.
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